Chapter XVIIOn Theology in the Subject

Of that theology which God displays to us perfectly by gracious communication, this theology of ours which is in the human subject is a kind of imperfect form, insofar as it can be in this subject. For as all those actions of God which are purely from him obtain the perfect form and constitution proper to them in a single moment from their very origin, so, on the contrary, whatever actions proceed jointly from God and men, and in which God has willed men in some manner to be his fellow-workers (συνεργούς), are present in their subjects in a kind of imperfect form so long as we are in this life, and do not obtain their perfection in this age. And as [p. 93] nature, beginning from the most imperfect degree, strives little by little toward its perfection, so also these actions are brought by God's power, from a very slight and imperfect beginning, through their degrees and increments, gradually to some image of their perfection. Therefore this theology called in the subject can never be defined according to its degrees of perfection or imperfection, because it is as various as the subjects in which it is by God's grace, according to each degree of its imperfection. Yet since this theology, however it is in anyone, is not more theology in this man than in that, but is considered only greater or less according to the [col. 1416] capacity of each (as, for example, we say that a short oak is not less an oak, but a smaller oak, than another that is tall), it is permissible to define theology in the subject according to its essence in some way, apart from comparing these differing imperfections. For Christ too taught us that faith, which has a necessary relation with this theology, is not more or less faith, but greater or smaller according to its subjects, when he said to the Apostles, If ye have faith as a grain of mustard seed, ye shall say unto this mountain, Remove hence to yonder place; and it shall remove, etc. (Matt. 17:20). Observing this account prudently, therefore, we define this theology of ours (which is called theology in the subject) as follows. Thesis XXXIV. Our theology in a certain respect, or theology called in the subject, is that same wisdom of divine things, modified according to the condition of the men in whom it is, and from which they are called theologians. From this definition it can easily be known what this theology has in common with our theology absolutely so called, and in what it differs from it. Two things are posited as common: the genus and the common difference, as they call it. The genus is wisdom, of which we spoke already in chapter 2. The common difference is that it is the wisdom of divine things, of whose nature, constitution, forms, and order we touched on briefly in chapter 13, as far as seemed to pertain to this undertaking.

Now, then, we must come to the proper difference. For clarity we propose it in two ways: according to its nature or essence, and according to its sign. To the difference of this theology according to its essence belong these words, that it is said to be modified according to the condition of the men in whom it is. The difference from the sign we have marked by the words from which they are called theologians. For properly observing the essential difference (so to speak) of this theology of ours, two things must concur: the subject and its condition, and the gift of wisdom adhering in the subject. For since the nature of this subject is always imperfect, it can in reality contain nothing perfect of itself; or if it does contain something perfect by God's grace (as it does), it cannot contain it perfectly. This is the account we always want observed in the subject, so that we may judge fittingly of the gift or grace that comes to it. For the subject is twofold according to its account and condition: one in nature, the other in grace. The subject in its nature can contain a perfect thing, or contain anything perfectly, neither in act, nor in potency, nor by any disposition to potency. But the same subject considered in grace, or (as they say) in the state of grace, while it is here, does receive the perfect gift and good giving that comes from God (as James says, ch. 1, v. 17). Yet since it always clings in some imperfection of nature, and is moved only by grace begun, it cannot contain perfectly that perfect gift and good giving that proceeds from God; although by singular grace it has sometimes happened that a man of God contained that gift perfectly. From this account of the subject, then, proceeds the modification of our theology: although theology is perfect in itself, in the subject (however perfect it may be) it is in a manner maimed by the imperfection of the subject. And therefore the form of theology in itself is perfect, but the form of theology in the subject is imperfect, because the latter is [p. 94] in us a pure beginning by grace. The argument for this modification comes from the sign, which we brought in at the end of the definition. For as they hold that a quality is that from which we are called such, so too theology must be said to be that from which men are called theologians. Now the condition of theologians is such that they agree with one another in the subject, insofar as they are men, but differ very greatly in degree, because we see more of theology in some, less in others. For if anyone should think that a beginner savors theology as much as John or Paul did, or that the same man, as a theologian, can accomplish as much when he is learning the first elements of theology as when, by long habit, he has his senses exercised to discern good and evil by the canon of true theology, he should surely be consigned, by the judgment of good men, to the care of his kinsmen and clansmen (as the saying goes).¹ Therefore a few notes and precepts on the mode and causes of this theology had to be added to the preceding definition, so that both extremes of error (into one of which the common people easily slide) might be guarded against with sure reverence and prudence.

For there are some who, as soon as they have drunk in even the slightest taste [col. 1417] of this wisdom, think themselves theologians pure and simple and think they rattle off nothing but theology; whom you might more truly, as they deserve, call enthusiasts (ἐνθουσιαστάς). There are others, on the contrary, who, having noticed the meagerness of this theology of ours in its subject, and the vanity (alas!) of many theologians, think that it is nothing but vain talk (ματαιόλογον); and these men rush headlong into wicked godlessness (ἀθεότητα), while they become vain in their imaginations. To forestall these evils devoutly and holily, it seemed necessary to add some few heads on the mode of this theology, so that the truth of the divine matter, however obscure, might be vindicated from the lies of men. The first is this: Thesis XXXV. The mode of this theology in the subject cannot be circumscribed, because it both varies within each person and is most diverse among all. By mode we mean here not the form of the thing (for the form of theology is always divine in all its degrees), nor the way of grasping and perceiving it (for this too is a divine work and the seal of divine grace), but the quantity (so to speak) of the grasp and perception of it that has come to a man. For as more or less liquid is poured into vessels according to their size, so too the souls of men are enlarged more or less by the power of God, to become capable both of the other spiritual gifts and of this wisdom itself. Therefore we rightly affirm that the mode of this theology, or rather of the men who share in this theology, cannot be circumscribed. For since science is of universals, while this mode belongs to individuals, to singulars (as they call them), you would sooner drain the ocean with a sieve than obtain any certain science of this matter. We must first see the causes of this countless variety, and then show some definite heads (if it can be done), by which at least some account of the matter in hand may be given, as suits our undertaking. The causes do not reside at all in theology itself, since it is in itself plainly uniform and cannot be in different conditions. We must therefore find the causes, whatever they are, in the subject itself. And there are in all two causes proceeding from the condition of the subject: one, that the singular subject, that is, each man, varies in himself as much as anything does and is beset by countless changes; the other, that subjects differ from one another very greatly. Since the condition of subjects is so various and manifold, both in themselves and among themselves, the mode of this wisdom, which inheres in subjects so changeable in themselves and so different from one another, must also vary altogether. Of the first manner of change we lay down as follows: Thesis XXXVI. Theology varies within each person, because there is in each a twofold principle, nature and grace, of which the former must be diminished and the latter increased from glory to glory, by the power of the Spirit and the effective communication of theology. That each person changes in himself, and so the mode of theology changes in the same person, common experience testifies [p. 95] most clearly, and all see it even by the testimony of common sense; but they do not all equally see the causes. For since the causes of change are in the principles of this wisdom, from which men are constituted knowers of theology, and since there are two kinds of these principles, of which one, nature, is their principle insofar as they are men, and the other, grace, is their principle insofar as they are endowed with this wisdom above the mode of their nature, it can in no way fail to happen that they are brought to the grasp of this wisdom through various changes and by degrees of change. Nature, because it is the common principle of all men, all perceive to be changeable and, as it were, rolled about in perpetual circles and changes. But grace working in men by degrees of change none properly see except those whose eyes God has illumined by grace; though the signs of that grace may sometimes be seen even by men utterly estranged from that grace. The effect of these principles, concurring together in one and the same subject, is plainly different. For as the nature of the subject of itself tends toward destruction, the natural man, or our outward man, must perish and be corrupted, but the inward man, whom grace moves, be increased and renewed day by day (2 Cor. 4:16). So it comes about that all of us whom God has graciously made nurslings of his theology, beholding with open face as in a glass the glory of God, are changed into the same image from glory to glory, even as by the Spirit of the Lord (2 Cor. 3:18). Thus the weakness of nature of itself fails day by day the more, the more the efficacy of grace advances, the author of which grace is the Spirit by his power: [col. 1418] that Spirit of God, I say, who worketh all these in all, dividing to every man severally his gifts as he will (1 Cor. 12:11), and who most effectively communicates theology, or this divine wisdom, not only in common, but also separately and singularly, to each heir of divine grace.

And as no definite mode of theology can be given in each member of Christ who shares in this heavenly wisdom, so too we must hold that the mode is plainly uncertain if we compare with one another the condition of the very many men whom God has made sharers in theology; and this we have seen fit to set out in the second thesis, XXXVII. This theology varies among all, because nature is diminished and grace grows strong more in some than in others; although here no one at all comprehends perfectly, in every respect, the whole form of our theology. The reason of this proposition is so evident that it seems hardly to need explanation. For as each experiences change in himself from the two principles we laid down before, so from the same principles it has come about that the mode of this wisdom is most diverse among all men. For, to speak of nature first, we must consider it in two ways: as common to all, and as singular and proper to each, or (as the Fathers said) characteristic (χαρακτηριστική). And if each man has his own proper, characteristic (χαρακτηριστικήν), and singular nature, who does not see from this that by common nature all agree with one another, while by singular and proper nature difference comes in by necessity of nature? As, then, all men undergo the laws of change in common according to the changes of common nature, so each bears his own changes singularly according to the account of his particular and proper nature. And as in bodily things the nature of each man, passing through its vicissitudes and successions, is diminished little by little and finally perishes, by just such a law we recognize change and diminishing of nature in things pertaining to our mind. And what must be contemplated in the account of singular nature tending toward its diminishing and destruction must likewise, conversely, be contemplated in the account of grace growing in God's servants and all the godly, and rising happily toward its perfection; because the decrease of the one is the increase of the other. Only there is this difference in the matter: those decreases and diminishings of nature proceed from the power of grace opposing it, which will at last overcome [p. 96] and surpass it; but the increases are accomplished by the power and efficacy of grace alone. From this follows a second difference, or rather (if you will) an effect arising from the preceding difference: that as grace is raised and rises in godly minds, nature is pressed down in equal measure, and by contrary degrees (as they say). They proceed at an equal pace, the one failing and the other advancing: just as if someone, draining a cask pierced at both ends from below, were filling it from above with another liquid which drove out the lower; or as if a pure spirit poured in from above drove out some impure liquid settling below.

Yet however much men furnished with the Spirit of God may advance in the communication of that grace, it is always settled among all good men and lovers of truth that no one of all men, within all human memory, has ever comprehended the whole form of this theology of ours perfectly in every respect, or comprehends it at this time in this life, or will comprehend it in any age, so long as in this wretched station we walk by faith and do not attain by sight the end of this theology and of our faith. For (as the Apostle says, 1 Cor. 13:12) now we see through a glass, in a riddle, but then face to face; now we know in part, but then we shall know even as we have been known. And so the degrees in the mode of our theology are countless, as great as is the interval and difference of degrees from its lowest degree, which is next to nothing, to the highest degree, which man can never reach. Yet not even that man (whoever among men can be given of that kind) in whom nature has been diminished most and grace has grown and grown strong as much as possible; not even he, I say, who has been raised there by God's grace, has attained the whole form of this theology of ours so as to have perceived it in a perfect mode according to the just law of comprehension, or in every respect according to all the parts of our theology, with that perfection which agrees with the divine form of our theology. [col. 1419] For surely, if there are any such (for we say nothing here of the person of Christ, whose proper theology is that of union, as the inexhaustible fountain from which this theology of ours is drawn), such a man must certainly have been of the number of the Prophets or Apostles, on whom the Lord bestowed singular gifts according to their singular calling and ministry, for the demonstration of his Spirit and of divine wisdom. Yet if we look at Elijah or Elisha from the company of the Prophets; at John the Baptist, whom Christ himself declared greater than the prophets; at Peter, James, John, or Paul, not even in them, or in any of these men of God, must that perfection be said to have been. Rather we must hold that, as in the conduct of life God willed his grace to suffice, and his power to be made perfect in our weakness, so also in the matter of faith it was his counsel that his grace should suffice for each, and that his truth should rest in that slightness of his servants.

This we have concluded in a few words thus: Thesis XXXVIII. For the Prophets and Apostles did perceive the whole and perfect form of this theology, but not perfectly in themselves; and by a singular power of the Spirit they handed it down whole. All the rest [perceive it] neither whole nor perfectly. We call the whole form of theology that which embraces all its essential (so to speak) parts; the perfect form, that which contains the true and just mode, free of imperfection, both as to the whole and as to each of its parts. This theology of ours, then, called whole and perfect in this sense, we deny was grasped whole or perfectly by most; and if any perceived it, they were only the Prophets and Apostles, to whom the perfect communication of this theology of ours came by singular inspiration and revelation. So, while we grant that those most holy servants of God, the Prophets and Apostles, perceived the whole form of this theology, this must be understood according to the principles of theology itself: as we believe that Moses, [p. 97] God's faithful servant in all his house, received this whole form handed down from God, set it down in writing as perfect as he had received it from the Lord, and delivered it as the divine canon to the ancient Church. For in these principles the whole nature of theology is virtually contained; and those supreme men grasped these principles by a singular and extraordinary power put into them by the Spirit. In this respect we do not hesitate to grant that they attained the whole and perfect form of this theology; yet we by no means hold that they possessed it perfectly in themselves, but in their own mode and in the mode of the revelation made to them: and these two are enough to show the imperfection of this communication. For if we look to their mode, they were men beset by the same weaknesses as we, and hemmed in by the same narrow limits of slightness, according to the human lot, which is so imperfect while it is a pilgrim from the Lord that it cannot contain a perfect thing perfectly. For when, I ask you, does an imperfect efficient cause beget effects that are perfect or are deservedly held perfect? It is surely absurd for anyone to think that perfect effects can be begotten by or follow from an imperfect cause. And if anyone should say that they did not themselves accomplish this perfectly in their own mode, but that God worked this perfection in them, we have answered this too in the other member, when we said that this theology was not grasped perfectly by them even in the mode of revelation. For the author of revelation is perfect, and his work is perfect in itself, and so any revelation God has made is perfect in itself; but the account of divine revelation in itself is one thing, and quite another in an owl, or in one night-blind, or in a bat, or in one dim-sighted, who can take in only some small bit of that light. And if by the power of the divine Spirit the mind of the Prophets and Apostles was, as it were, enlarged and more fully enlightened beyond our mode and its common account (as it certainly was), it still cannot be concluded from this that it was enlarged to infinity, or with some infinite perfection, so that they could contain the perfection of this wisdom perfectly. We believe that it was received by them whole and perfect and free from all imperfection; but perfectly, and with so great a perfection that they too equaled in themselves the perfection of this wisdom in itself, we by no means affirm, nor would it be godly to affirm it. For why should we either think in our minds or declare to others anything else about those chosen instruments of God [col. 1420] than what they themselves have stated about themselves with divine truth and just humility? For Paul said of himself in common with others: We know in part, and we prophesy in part; now we see through a glass, in a riddle, but then face to face (1 Cor. 13:9, 12). And writing to Timothy, his own son in the faith, he commended the reading of Holy Scripture several times for no other purpose than to show that this slightness of ours, unequal to containing the perfection of divine things, must be fought against by holy reading, prayers, and meditations through the whole course of this life, until by a happy passing to the Lord we have attained full victory over ourselves and our weakness.

And as they perceived this whole wisdom, so too the Lord provided for his Church that the same should be handed down whole and perfect by a singular power of the Spirit, who used not the work of one man alone to hand down this whole and perfect doctrine in the Church, but brought it about from the whole and perfect doctrine of them all that we should have a perfect body of theology, set down in the Holy Scriptures from the labor of all those servants of God, and the whole perfect form of this wisdom perfectly set forth. Hence the Apostle says excellently that all Scripture is given by inspiration of God, that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works (2 Tim. 3:16–17); because Scripture is a perfect instrument provided to us by God, although we are each of us workmen imperfect in every part.

[p. 98] Here a question arises which may perhaps trouble less experienced students of Holy Scripture. Since we say that Scripture is a perfect instrument of theology, and yet we see that the Prophets and Apostles sometimes said and wrote things at variance with the truth that God reveals, how can we call this Scripture a perfect instrument? For example: Samuel said, when he saw Eliab, David's eldest brother, Surely the LORD's anointed is before him (1 Sam. 16:6). Likewise Nathan said to the King when he was thinking of building the holy house, Go, do all that is in thine heart; for the LORD is with thee (2 Sam. 7:3). Paul wrote that he would set out for Spain, and on that journey come to the Romans (Rom. 15:24); and the same to the Corinthians and Thessalonians. Since, then, they said, or even wrote, what was false, how (someone may say) can Scripture be called a perfect instrument, when answers and promises in it have been found false? Although anyone who attends carefully to the very definition of our theology can learn the solution of this doubt, yet so that the less skilled may not be delayed, we shall set it out briefly thus. The knowledge of divine things is one thing; the knowledge of our human counsels and will or judgment is another. Among divine things we count not only those which God does, but also those which he testifies by his word, whether by way of the common word or by singular revelation. Under human counsels or judgments, on the other hand, we comprise all things that are put forward by men, however holy and with however holy a purpose, apart from God's common or singular testimony, or by any human judgment whatever. Of this kind were those judgments of Samuel and Nathan, when without consulting God, according to their own opinion (by no means a bad one), they determined otherwise than God had defined by his secret judgment. For they had not ceased to be men because they were prophets; both kinds of action were exercised by them: the human according to nature, the prophetic according to the relation of grace that had been added to nature. And Scripture narrates truthfully this false judgment of theirs, as the faithfulness of history requires.

But the example of Paul seems weightier, because no godly man holds in his mind anything other than that the epistles of the holy Apostles which have been received into the canon of the Church of Christ were written by the sure dictation of the Holy Spirit; and yet Paul promised one thing in his words, and another thing followed in the event by God's appointment. Yet if we look more deeply into the matter, we shall see that it makes little difference whether they said or wrote what they judged to pertain to the account of their ministry. For it is agreed that in their speeches and in their writings alike, insofar as the ministry of the apostolate was discharged by them, the power of the Spirit presided over them and governed all things. And so nothing can be faulted on this score even in the epistles, nor does it seem that anything can rightly be. For first, nothing pertaining to the doctrine and manner [col. 1421] of faith can anywhere be faulted. Nor does it immediately follow, if something human is said or written that is in no way contrary to piety or to the truth of faith and holiness, that the authority of the divine things delivered perishes; because what is said humanly is not itself theology, and it is no more foreign to a theologian to speak or write humanly than it is foreign to a man to be engaged in this wisdom which we call theology. Indeed, this seems rather more fitting: for as a man is a man by nature, so by nature he does what belongs to a man by the property of nature; but as he is a theologian by grace, he does not do what belongs to a theologian except by the singularity of grace. Moreover, it seemed good to the wisdom of God to make it openly evident in this way that human opinions, judgments, and wishes which pertain to piety and charity are approved and sanctified by God, even though their effect is to turn out otherwise by God's secret will. And if there were no examples of these, no doubt the boldness of some superstitious men and the [p. 99] imprudence of many would judge unjustly of this kind of writings and counsels. For which of those Catos would not have censured the human and affectionate greetings which the Apostles appended at the end of their epistles, or the commendation of Onesimus to Philemon, unless he reflected that the Apostles, and Paul by name, wrote so, and that God by his authority deposited these humble proofs of humanity in the treasury of his Church? In this manner, then, out of human kindness and [without] awareness of a particular revelation,² Paul had promised that he would come to the Romans, the Corinthians, and the Thessalonians, with sure confidence in divine grace, which approves these human promises even if it does not accomplish their fulfillment. For God alone promises in the certainty of truth; man promises in the truthfulness of his mind, leaving to God the certainty of the whole matter, as James warns in his epistle (4:15), and Paul expressly states in writing to the Romans (15:32). And this is why Paul most zealously frees the promises of God in Christ from all such uncertainty (2 Cor. 1:17–20, etc.), while showing that the human promises made by himself and others are always joined with their own uncertainty, which has nothing at all to do with the promises of God. For so he argues in that place, excusing his conduct in having raised hope of his coming and yet not having come: For our rejoicing is this, he says, the testimony of our conscience, that in simplicity and godly sincerity, not with fleshly wisdom, but by the grace of God, we have had our conversation in the world, and more abundantly to you-ward. Then: And in this confidence I was minded to come unto you before (for he had told them by letter that he wished to), that ye might have a second benefit; and to pass by you into Macedonia, and to come again out of Macedonia unto you, and of you to be brought on my way toward Judea. When I therefore was thus minded, did I use lightness? (namely, at the time I promised, promising thoughtlessly) or the things that I purpose (namely, at this very time, when I am adopting another plan), do I purpose according to the flesh, that with me there should be yea yea, and nay nay? That is, in sum: was I fickle then, or am I fickle now at this time? He answers: But as God is true, he assures me that our word toward you was not yea and nay; that is, that I have always been consistent in my words. But since the Apostle has two kinds of speech, as God's ambassador, and as a man speaking humanly without God's definite and express command, he adds something about each distinctly. First he declares magnificently of the ministerial speech of his apostleship: For the Son of God, Jesus Christ, who was preached among you by us, even by me and Silvanus and Timotheus, was not yea and nay, but in him was yea. He proves this affirmation by a universal statement, saying: For all the promises of God in him are yea, and in him Amen, unto the glory of God by us. A twofold confirmation is added: one, Now he which stablisheth us with you in Christ, and hath anointed us, is God;³ the other, Who hath also sealed us, and given the earnest of the Spirit in our hearts. Then, passing to the other kind of speech, he clears himself by a solemn appeal to God, saying: Moreover I call God for a record upon my soul, that to spare you I came not as yet unto Corinth; and what follows in the same chapter and in part of the second. Since these things are so, we hold altogether that the Apostles were ministers of this heavenly wisdom in such a way that they handed it down perfectly to the Church of God; and that they were not thereby prevented from stating and writing humanly, from the duty of charity, counsels [col. 1422] directed to that end, though with a different outcome; and yet that it cannot be counted a fault in them if they did not know all that God knows, or simply willed what God does not will by his absolute will; because to know and to will these things belongs to deity, while it belongs to humanity to know no more of these things, or to will with determinate will no more, than has been revealed to them by God through his Spirit, for his glory.