Chapter XIOn Supernatural Theology

Having set out the weakness of this nature of ours, from which the mode of natural theology can be surely grasped, we must now see what it is that nature desires, and from where a way of attaining the thing it desires can come. Whether you consider our nature as common, insofar as all desire the good in common, or as singular, insofar as each is drawn to desire this or that according to his condition, we see that it is always carried toward attaining its own good and fleeing the contrary. And this striving of nature usually shines out so plainly even in the slightest things that no one, however unskilled, fails to sense that the good is to be desired under nature's guidance. But since nothing in all things seems to be of such necessity, usefulness, and dignity as that man, set as the chief in this universe of things, should be brought to his good, [p. 71] to which he cannot rise by the faculty of nature, by human art, or by the help of any created thing; it was therefore necessary either that man himself investigate by every means from where he might obtain the way and method of that good, or that he be led, by the kindness of one who is able to bestow it, to the knowledge and grasp of the way by which he might attain the good. But that man should come to know the very author of that good of his, the way to him, and the manner of receiving the good, by the powers of his nature, or by any art or aid of a created thing, could certainly never have happened. For how would a creature lost in itself, and by just judgment cut off from the author of its good, have come to him? How would the blind see the invisible? How would the dead grasp and set out on the way by which it could strive toward the good (the good, that is, which is truly good)?

Thesis XX. Wherefore that inspired theology had to come upon man, which from its origin we call supernatural, and from its gracious mode of communication the theology of revelation. Otherwise it would never have come about that man's mind, emerging from the sense of its evil, should arrive at a sure hope and grasp of the good. The author of the good therefore had to approach wretched and cast-down man, since man could in no way climb up to him. Now God, the author of every good, approaches men variously according to the various mode of his working; but if any [approach] is saving to us while we live in this life, it is certainly the gift of thought by which we learn to know God as we are known by him. This is the good we call inspired theology: for by inspiration God knows us, or rather testifies that we are known to him; and by the theology he inspires in us we know God as we have been known by him. This saving inspiration of God, and the knowledge communicated by his kindness, we say comes upon us, because neither in us, nor with us, nor with the things that surround us, nor in the whole universe of things can there exist any principle or seed of this good effective for the salvation of men; but God, the author of the good, who is in all, and through all, and above all, must pour that saving grace upon us from above, and so it comes upon us from there; so that we may believe him when he speaks of heavenly things, we who did not believe him even when he spoke of earthly things. The origin, nature, and mode of this whole mystery had to be effected from above. Hence it arose that we called this inspired theology supernatural from its origin, and from its gracious mode the theology of revelation; since by its origin, its nature, [col. 1397] and its mode of communication it shows most powerfully that in this matter nothing comes except from God, and that it is accomplished by divine power. It must be observed, however, that when this theology is called the theology of revelation, it is said by way of eminence (κατ᾽ ἐξοχήν), and in a narrower sense than was proposed in chapters 8 and 9. For there we called the theology of revelation that which God communicates here with man, whether by natural or by supernatural grace; but here, comparing the revelation of supernatural grace with nature and the goods of nature, and establishing their opposition to each other, we have undertaken to speak only of supernatural revelation and the gracious mode of communication.

Thesis XXI. Supernatural theology is the wisdom of divine things that proceeds from principles known in themselves by the light of a higher knowledge, above the mode of human reason. In these words, following in the footsteps of the definition we gave earlier of natural theology, we define supernatural theology briefly. Everyone easily understands the genus and difference of this theology from what precedes. The genus is wisdom: not, indeed, that archetypal wisdom of which we spoke at the beginning (for that is the universal principle, and so cannot be included in any genus), but wisdom called so equivocally, flowing down from that universal principle through Christ Jesus, in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and understanding. The difference is set out by the causes in a fixed order. The efficient cause of this theology is God pouring in the light of that higher knowledge; [p. 72] the material cause is principles known in themselves in divine things; and finally the formal cause, that from those principles, by that higher light, one proceeds above the mode of human reason. We posit here, as the efficient cause, God pouring in the light of higher knowledge, or wisdom, for these principles, because (as we said before) in this communication of grace there is but one Spirit, who worketh all in all as he will, and communicates the light of that higher and heavenly knowledge by the illumination of his power. For since all sciences are so constituted that they either have their light of themselves from nature or borrow it from another, higher science, and since this knowledge surpasses in every respect all others that are known or can be known, we have seen fit to call it, comparatively, higher knowledge, to show that this knowledge is heavenly, higher than all knowledge of this earth or of the whole world; or (if you will) the highest of all things that can ever be known and grasped by man. Indeed, by this very name do we not proclaim this wonderful knowledge to be higher not only than other sciences, but also than ourselves, our nature, and the very universe of things? So it comes about that, drawn as far as possible away from familiarity with and knowledge of these things, we run past all that is in created things and fly up to that unquenchable light, beset by no changes or shadows, that is, to God himself. From this light, then, which God willed to be communicated to us by singular grace, it comes to us that we grasp the matter of supernatural theology, namely divine things, that is, God himself, and whatever things there are insofar as they are ordered to God: that we grasp them, I say, as the most just and holy subject of this wisdom, and hold within us those heavenly principles known of themselves, with which God has enlightened us here, as instruments necessary for the grasping of divine things. Hence follows the form of this theology and divine wisdom, which lies in the act of that knowledge of ours, when we hold that this supernatural theology proceeds in the knowledge of divine things from principles divinely implanted, above the mode of human reason, and indeed of all created understanding. For if the light of the higher knowledge is from God, if the principles of that light are, if the progress of the light is, then our progress or procession in grasping divine things above the capacity of our reason must also be credited to him.

Thesis XXII. This supernatural theology may be considered in two ways: either absolutely and in itself, according to the mode of the one communicating; or in a certain respect, according to the small measure of those to whom the communication comes. What we say stands thus. Whatever knowledge or wisdom comes into question is considered either as it is in its nature and genus, simply; or as it is not in its nature and genus, but in a certain concrete manner, compositely.¹ [col. 1398] What is in its nature and in its genus is called abstract; what is otherwise, concrete. For example, justice is said to be a nature; the just man, in whom justice inheres together with a subject, is not a nature, because he is not one thing properly and of himself. Now everything that is, by the very fact that it is, is one. And what is a nature and in a genus is more excellent than what is concrete, because whatever consists of its pure and absolute nature and has nothing mixed and joined with it unlike and dissimilar to itself is a nature and is in a genus. For justice is always one and the same, changeable in no persons, times, or places; the just man has a changeable nature and undergoes change, which justice is free of. In the same way, those who are to speak of theology must be careful that the form of theology according to its nature and genus, as it is utterly whole and uncorrupted,² is not deformed and adulterated by the admixture of anything concrete, or made (so to speak) base-alloyed (ὑπόχαλκος). For if you confuse what belongs to the subject, or is according to its subject, with that most holy and undefiled mother and discloser (if one may so call it) of our salvation, you will certainly attain neither rightly, [p. 73] neither the dignity of theology nor the truth of the subject that this theology begets and with which it has been communicated by God. We must, then, establish altogether a twofold account of theology, since it is observed one way in itself, from its nature and essence, and another way in that slight and weak subject, men, who are called theologians from receiving and grasping it. The first mode of theology we delimit both by its names and by a definite determination, saying that this theology is absolute, and theology in itself, according to the mode of the one communicating. When we say absolute, we show that our purpose is to treat theology considered absolutely and simply, apart from the admixture of anything else, whether the subject or other things approaching it from wherever they come. That is why this theology is also usually called theology in itself, that is, according to its natural condition and proper essence (as they call it): so that there is nothing foreign in it, and nothing of its own not in it, as it is formed by God. Its determination we have laid down in those few words, according to the mode of the one communicating. For since the mode of things that proceed from another's power and efficacy comes from the producer, and theology, the worthiest subject among created things and above all created things, cannot have been brought to us by chance or at random, they act altogether rightly and wisely who take its mode from its producer. Now the things another produces have a twofold mode: one adequate to the power of the efficient cause, as man is begotten by man; the other inferior and in no way adequate, as happens in very many things. For the works of artisans are not equal to the artisans, nor are external works equal to the internal works that are formed in the mind by the artisan's will and counsel. The author and producer of our theology is God, who graciously communicates it to the human race, and that according to his mode; yet not that adequate mode, that is, according to the mode of his essence, which is infinite, but a mode not adequate, that is, according to the mode of his will, tempering his revelations to the convenience of our condition. For adequate wisdom is that which we have called archetypal or prototypal theology; next to it comes the theology of union in Christ Jesus; after this, the theology of vision in the heavenly saints; and the third place, finally, is held by this theology of ours. If it is in no way to be compared with the theology of the saints in heaven, it would certainly be far more unjust for anyone to set it against the theology of union, and most unjust of all to set it against that archetypal and essential theology. The mode of this absolute theology, then, is given by the one communicating, according to the mode of his wisdom and goodness, by his set will and counsel, by which he tempered his revelations to our condition and freely accommodated himself to the capacity of men and the salvation of his Church.

This is that absolute theology, comprehending perfectly the whole perfect account, which it pleased God to reveal to all in common, to the praise of his glorious grace in Christ Jesus. From this wholly divine and perfect theology, set out for the community of men by God's grace, has flowed that other account of theology which we call in a certain respect. Yet it must not be thought, when [col. 1399] we declare that this divine theology is modified, that we wish for any reason to detract from its truth. For we venerate that theology and honor it most devoutly, and would rather lament our weakness and the narrowness of our mind than detract even a little from that most holy and perfect theology. But since all virtues (as we said before) are by nature far more excellent in themselves than in any subject of theirs, as justice in itself is one thing and the justice of a man, spoken of with a restriction, another, it comes about that we call theology in a certain respect that which is in man and according to man, whose simple form we have called absolute theology. Absolute theology, then, is like a most pure form; theology in a certain respect is like a form [p. 74] added to matter, determined more narrowly and made finite according to the condition of its matter. And it is agreed that the narrower and more unworthy the matter, the narrower is made the form that comes to it. Since, then, the subject of this theology is man, who is called a theologian from grasping it, and since this subject overflows with vanity and weakness, it matters greatly, both for divine truth and for our instruction, that theology in a certain respect be distinguished most accurately from absolute theology. For absolute theology is a pure conception offered by God; theology in a certain respect is a conception grasped by man, but made impure by his condition and rendered imperfect. All the more unjust toward the Church of God, then, seem those who at this time know no other theology than that which is according to men and from men, and who in this matter depend on men's judgment and authority just as if that pure conception and divine form of theology which we call absolute had either vanished entirely or passed, by the law of ownership, into the hands and power of men. For that form, that conception, is abiding, not changeable at men's will; all men must believe it, and it must not yield to ignorant and weak men. The determination (as they call it), or delimitation, of this theology which we call in a certain respect we have expressed in these words: according to the small measure of those to whom the communication comes. The mode of the giver is one thing, that of the receiver another. For the one who gives and supplies theology is God; we receive it as supplied by God. The giver has most wisely tempered his gift, that is, our absolute theology, so as to pour out most graciously, and set before men in common, whatever is necessary for his Church in common; but those who receive are very far from receiving what God bestows in common. For each has his own small measure, and the whole Church in each age its own, and that most imperfect, according to the ignorance, weakness, and slightness of all. Therefore notable and intolerable is the insult to God, and more atrocious the wrong to his Church, of those men who suppose that the fullness of this unbelievable treasure can reside in vessels so weak and unfit, in this wretched and mortal life. So much in general for supernatural theology. Now, with God as our author, let us pass to its definition and particular exposition.