Franciscus Junius, On True Theology

Chapter XIIIOn the Material Cause of Our Theology

Translated from the Latin by Claude · Working translation

About this text

Latin public domain · new translation

Draft English translation by Claude (Anthropic) from Kuyper’s Latin text of the second edition, made independently of David C. Noe’s published translation, with Kuyper’s page and column markers and translator’s notes. Source: Abraham Kuyper, ed., D. Francisci Junii Opuscula theologica selecta (1882), 39–101.

Junius’s Latin (first published 1594) and Kuyper’s 1882 edition of it are in the public domain in the United States. The English translation and its notes are new, made for Baptist Seminarian from that Latin text. Rights evidence. Verified 2026-10-22.

Although we have placed in the definition, in the fixed and ordinary order of nature, all the causes needed for a just definition of our theology absolutely so called, we have nevertheless chosen, for convenience of teaching, to speak first of the internal and essential causes of theology, and then of those that are joined to it from outside [col. 1403] or extrinsically. We call internal causes those which constitute the essence of the thing being discussed, such as matter and form in all things; external, whatever adheres to the constituted thing as something external, either to its generation, as the efficient cause, or to its operation and effect, as the end. The account of teaching requires the one order more; nature observes the other. We shall therefore take up the internal causes first, and put off the external to the later place. To consider first, then, the matter of sacred theology, we set out its matter, keeping to the footsteps of Scripture and of nature itself, as follows. Thesis XXIV. The matter of theology is divine things: namely God, and whatever is ordered to God, according as the teaching of God concerning his nature, works, and right had to be delivered. This, then, whether we call it matter, subject, or object, as these names can be predicated of the argument of theology in different respects, we define by the name divine things. By divine things we want to be understood here those which are either truly divine, or, if they belong to the nature of things, are nevertheless in some way ordered to God. Wishing to express this, some of the orthodox Fathers defined the matter of theology so as to declare that everything is to be counted in the matter of theology which either is God in the nominative case (as the grammarians say), or can be said to be, in an oblique case, of God, to God, toward God, or from God; that which, finally, according to all the cases (as the grammarians call them) has its definite relation and ordering to God. Properly and simply, God is the subject or matter of theology; just as each science or discipline must have some one definite and defined subject or matter. For the subject in each science is related to the science as the object is related to our natural power or habit. And it is agreed that that is properly assigned as the object of a human power or habit under whose formal aspect all things are referred to that power or habit: as (for example) articulate speech and a crash are referred to hearing insofar as they are sounding, because sound, or a sounding thing as sounding, is the proper object of our hearing; and likewise a man and a beast are referred to sight insofar as they are colored, because color, or a colored thing, is the object of our sight. In the same way, all things in this sacred theology are treated under the formal aspect of God, as the proper matter dealt with in theology: [p. 79] because either it is God himself who is treated, or things ordered to God as their universal principle and their end. The holy Apostles too, or the apostolic men nearest their times, observed this very account in the holy Creed, when they made God the subject of the principles in which the whole science is virtually contained, and placed after the articles concerning God certain heads concerning the Church and the divine benefits toward it; so that the principles placed first would show what is of itself the subject of our theology, and the later ones would hold the things that are related to and affected by the subject in a singular way.

From what we have just said it follows that a twofold order of these things that are called divine must be established: one concerning God, whom we are to enjoy; the other concerning the things of God, which we are to use according to God, as Augustine explained at length in On Christian Doctrine, book 1. To the topic concerning God simply belong these two: the account of his nature and the account of his will. Of his nature, whether you regard it according to the essence subsisting in three persons, or according to the distinction of persons in the unity of essence. Of his will: both that which in a manner extends universally to all created things; and that which is common and set forth in common to the human race; and finally that which is set forth by a singular account of grace in his Church. To the other topic, concerning things ordered to God, belong roughly three things set out in the Holy Scriptures: namely, the nature of things, insofar as it is ordered to God; the works of God in them; and the right assigned to them by God. We say the nature of things is explained by the discipline of sacred theology not simply as they are (for to search out scrupulously, review, and deliver that belongs to physicists, physicians, and philosophers, who immerse themselves without measure or end in searching out and reviewing the works of nature), but only insofar as [col. 1404] they have their relation and respect to God by necessity of nature, and God to them by the freedom of his will. For theology does not teach the nature of angels, as the metaphysicians do; nor of living things or elementary things, as the physicists do; nor the nature by abstraction (τὴν ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως), as the mathematicians do; but [theologians] deliver the nature and condition of the several things that pertain to this discipline only as they are referred to God and ordered to him by their relation. The same judgment holds for works. For the works of God in all created things are so observed, by the shining torch of divine theology, that what comes into account is not simply and universally whatever God does in them, but only those things which, according to the ordering we have just expressed, either God does in them or they do according to God. Now God acts most freely by his most free will, either universally, both ordinarily according to nature and extraordinarily according to his providence; or in common, according to the common calling of saving grace set before all; or finally singularly, according to the singular calling of saving grace put into his elect by the Spirit of sanctification unto eternal life. Conversely, created things act in serving God's ordering: either universally, obeying by the instinct of universal nature and by a common law his nature and providence; or in common, looking to that common calling set before all in a common manner; or finally singularly, following with all honor and obedience, as is fitting, his manifold and wonderful wisdom, most effective for their salvation.

But since all the praise of virtue consists in action, as Tully said, and the only true praise is that which comes not from men false in judgment and fickle in their zeal but from God himself, the most evident topic of matter in which sacred theology usually dwells is that which Paul several times called the judgment of God (τὸ δικαίωμα τοῦ θεοῦ) (Rom. 1:32). For there is a definite right imposed by God on nature, and a definite right of grace; and this right is asserted here by the principles of nature, and from above by the principles of grace [p. 80] communicated by God. For there is a twofold rectitude, or right conduct (κατόρθωμα) and duty, established by God for the human race: one common, in good part, with the other things in this universe, namely the law of nature, which we are taught by its instinct; the other proper to the human race, as alone created after the image of God, the law of morals, or the moral law. By the former, goods and evils according to nature are judged; by the latter, goods and evils according to morals, that is, virtues and vices: the former proceeding from a common principle, which they call the instinct of nature or the natural will; the latter from a singular and internal principle, which they call the mind, that is, the fountain of reason and will. This law of morals, by which men must approach God and be conformed as far as possible to his holy will, sacred theology sets out most perfectly: digging up, as it were, the natural principles buried in us by our depravity and endowing them with perfection, and setting supernatural glory before our eyes with such light, faith, and power that the rest are nothing compared with this wisdom. This, then, is the most certain matter with which our theology is occupied, with God as author and guide; and if we occupy ourselves in it, it will truly come to pass that we, beholding with open face as in a glass the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image, as by the Spirit of the Lord (2 Cor. 3:18).