Chapter XIVOn the Formal Cause of Our Theology

Now that we are agreed on the matter of our theology, we must come to examine its other internal cause, so that we may hold its essential constitution with certainty. That cause is the form, without which all matter is as it were indefinite and ungraspable (ἀκατάληπτος), and by which, when added to matter, the nature of a thing is both constituted in itself and perceived by our intellect. The form of theology absolutely so called we delimit in a few words as follows: Thesis XXV. The form of theology is divine truth, which is considered in theology in two ways: either the whole, or some part of the whole, is considered simply in itself; or some parts are considered in relation to others by a just comparison. In these [col. 1405] words we set out briefly two things most necessary in this undertaking: one, what the account of this form is in itself; the other, what the account is of its being set forth to us and received according to that saving teaching which God willed to bestow on men by grace. The account of this essential form we define by saying, the form is divine truth; the other topic we set out in the words that follow. That truth is the essential form of theology absolutely so called no godly man will doubt, if indeed he believes Christ, our highest Prophet and Teacher, when he says, Sanctify them through thy truth: thy word is truth (John 17:17). But since the name of truth, used indiscriminately by the common people, is for the most part not so much understood in the mind as carried about in everyone's mouth, we shall offer a brief explanation of it at this time. The ancients declared most rightly that truth is convertible with and equal to being (as they call it), that is, with that which is. For whatever is, by the very fact that it is, is true; and conversely, whatever is true, by that very fact is, insofar as it is true. These two always cohere with each other so necessarily, are so reciprocal and pass back and forth so, that nothing at all in the nature of things or above nature [p. 81] can be brought forward that is not held by both under this common law. Yet although these two laws are perpetual in all things and are to be applied perpetually to all things, each is said on a different account. For if we say that something is, we consider it in the thing; but if we declare that it is true, we consider what is in our intellect. Truth, then, belongs both to the things that are and to the signs by which the things that are are said to be; or (to put it more briefly, and perhaps more clearly) truth is of things, or of speech uttered about things. Of the things that are, the account is twofold: some are in the thing, others in the intellect. In the thing are the particulars (τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα), that is, singulars and individuals, as they are perceived by sense; in the intellect are the forms, both of the things we have perceived individually by sense and of all others that we have perceived in any other way. And so the truth of the things commonly called intelligible, or which fall under our intellect, is far worthier and fuller than the truth of things perceived outwardly in the thing. It is fuller in that it embraces singulars and common things alike; and worthier in that common things are worthier than singulars, and forms abstracted and purified from matter are worthier than material things, whose generation and constitution, compounded of principles differing among themselves, plainly cries out that truth is not properly and of itself in the keeping of such things.

But although the truth that can be grasped by the human intellect stands thus, far, far above this truth which nature teaches all men rises that truth which we call divine. By this singular name we claim the formal truth of theology free from all change and changeableness of nature, and lift it above the nature of this universe and of all things in it. For divine truth is not only that which has its origin from God, the God of truth (for the truth of nature and of the natural intellect too has its origin from God); but that alone is called divine truth by us, by its own proper and singular right, which in reality, by its own account, in every way, in itself and in all its parts, and in every ordering of it, is divine. Since divine truth exists in two ways, infinitely, as it is essential in God, and finitely, as it has been communicated by God to created things, both must be observed most diligently in our theology absolutely so called. For we recognize in it the infinite truth as the immutable archetype and first form of truth, and we revere most devoutly the communicated truth as a mirror and expressed image of that archetypal truth. That is why in the definition of this theology we did not say simply that theology is the wisdom of divine things, or the wisdom of divine truth; but we expressed both jointly, that this wisdom is of divine things, according to divine truth, inspired by God, etc. In this way we expressed a certain necessary relation that comes between truth expressing itself and truth expressed. Truth expressing itself is that immutable conception and form in God, which we devoutly adore. Truth expressed is nothing other than a kind of image and mirror of that first and eternal truth: what of it, of what kind, how much, and finally in what manner God has communicated [col. 1406] to us, to testify to the praise of his glorious grace and to set forth our salvation. This truth is according to that truth: a perfect stream from a perfect spring, a perfect ray from a perfect sun of truth, finally a perfect image expressed in the mirror of the word of truth; and this image will go on shining until we all arrive at that principle of truth in heaven.

What we said of the account of this truth, that it is considered in two ways in our theology, is most manifest in itself. For we are so constituted by our nature that wherever our mind and thought turn, we either contemplate the object of our intellect, that is, truth, universally and simply in some whole, or institute a comparison of this whole with that. As if, for example, [p. 82] someone were to consider the universal Church absolutely, or compare it with the rest of the world; or if someone wished to weigh by itself the whole divine truth expressed in this theology of ours, or to set it beside the truth of our nature for its instruction and for the magnifying of divine grace. Again, the parts of the very thing whose truth is considered as a whole are set forth to us in the same way, and once set forth are explored by us, as if each part of the whole constituted some whole by itself: as if someone undertook to consider the church of the Corinthians or of the Philippians, or any other, in particular (as they say). And since the comparison of the parts considered by our intellect is made and explored by us among themselves according to the account of a single whole, or even of different wholes, the truth and just account of these things to be compared with one another is also shown by the same theology, so that no one may stray from divine truth, which alone is saving and certain truth: as if someone, for instance, compares the benefit of creation with providence in the nature of things, or natural benefits with benefits proceeding from grace, so as to search out and attain the truth more and more. Now this truth divinely expressed in our theology has certain definite attributes which God has properly sealed upon it, to claim it most powerfully from fellowship with the rest of truth observed in the nature of things. Although very many of this kind can be brought forward, we have comprehended in one or two theses certain chief and principal heads among them, from which godly and prudent souls will very easily attain from God's teaching any others of this kind there may be. For we have laid down in a few words: Thesis XXVI. This truth is holy, just, and perfect: it teaches nothing profane, unjust, or imperfect, and leaves nothing holy, just, or perfect untaught; so that we may be directed as perfectly as possible to holiness in ourselves, justice toward all, and perfection in all things.

In these few words we have seen fit to set out some essential properties of divine truth, before speaking of the virtues of that truth that follow from them, which we shall do in the next thesis. Three attributes, then, are predicated by us of this truth: that it is holy, just, and perfect. For if one would rightly examine the right constitution of any doctrine, these three must by all means be observed: first, that it be good in itself; second, that it be good toward others; third, that it be good in all respects. For if any of these is lacking in any doctrine, its constitution cannot deservedly be pronounced right. Looking to these duties, then, we have claimed as many attributes for divine truth, saying that it is holy in itself, just toward all, and perfect in all respects. For what, I ask you, could be affirmed holy, just, and perfect in human affairs or in any created things, compared with that truth which is from God and according to God? For if you look to the archetypal truth, it is the everlasting fountain of holiness and perfection; if to that truth communicated by God and set forth to the human race, it is the most holy, just, and perfect reservoir (to speak with the engineers) of that fountain, or the cistern and head of the saving water, from which we may all draw the most certain teaching of holiness, justice, and perfection, to which we may conform ourselves devoutly, receiving the end of our faith, even the salvation of our souls (1 Pet. 1:9). The mode of these attributes, which we assign with the fullest right to divine truth, is shown and comprehended by us in two ways: namely, in the substance and in the effect of that truth. To demonstrate the substance of divine truth according to these attributes among [col. 1407] men, two things are needed: first, that whatever is contrary to these attributes be wholly removed; second, that whatever belongs to the account of these attributes be wholly confirmed of divine truth. The first we expressed in these words: divine truth teaches nothing profane, unjust, or imperfect; the second in those: nothing holy, just, or perfect, that is, nothing that is teachable and learnable (διδακτὸν καὶ μαθητόν), that can be taught, learned, and known, [p. 83] is left untaught. These virtues are so present in the teaching of truth that nothing at all in created things, or that can be perceived by their intellect, can be compared with this truth. For if you look to the holiness of any doctrine in itself, what holiness, pray, can proceed from profane things? If to justice, what justice from unjust things? If to perfection, what perfection from most imperfect things? As we read in the book of Job: Who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean? Not one (Job 14:4). Certainly the proper nature of each cause is known from the quality of its power, and its power from its effects; nor can it ever happen that causes are surpassed by their effects, unless other, higher causes have come in besides, whose effect is attributed only improperly to the lower causes. Since, then, all human doctrine is from man, who is profane, unjust, and imperfect, we rightly judge that every other doctrine lacks these attributes. This doctrine alone, which has God most holy, most just, and most perfect as its author, is adorned with these praises. All other doctrines, even though they are from God, are nevertheless from instruments stained with some blot of profanity, injustice, and imperfection. Indeed, they teach nothing so holy, just, or perfect that some fault does not always cling to it from the author, from the nature of the doctrine, or from its method or manner. But this doctrine of truth has its holiness from God, and teaches it as being in God in such a way that, denying it to all created things and even to man himself, it shows that it is possessed in God alone. As for justice, by which each is given his due, to God according to piety, to men according to nature and their common and particular rights, no doctrine handed down by men teaches it without greatly diminishing God's right and our duty toward him, and (under whatever appearance this happens) without turning aside from the right account of human right, either by failing to command something just that ought to have been commanded, or by establishing something unjust that ought to have been guarded against. Therefore every human doctrine also always abounds and overflows with its own imperfection, since neither in the account of holiness, nor in that of justice, nor in that of all the things needed for the perfection of holiness, justice, or the order and agreement of all things among themselves, does it show the perfection that God, nature, and order require. But in this doctrine nothing of the kind can exist. For it is from an author holy, just, and perfect; it is, according to its author, just, holy, and perfect; and it is always in him, as in its exemplar, who is himself holiness, justice, and perfection. So it comes about that there is nothing evil in this doctrine, and nothing at all good that is not in it: a doctrine which that eternal holiness, justice, and perfection of God continually displays among the race of men as a mirror of itself, on which we may fix our eyes and cling to it most attentively and devoutly.

From the contemplation of this divine and saving mirror its effects follow in the men before whose eyes it is set, corresponding to those attributes. For since this doctrine of truth is holy, just, and perfect, a good cause must bring forth good fruits, and bring them forth in that alone in which it is planted and rooted by the will of God. This doctrine has been brought from heaven to men, who are called God's field, God's building, and God's husbandry (1 Cor. 3:9). These effects we set out, then, when we said that this doctrine was given and formed by God so that we may be directed as perfectly as possible to holiness in ourselves, justice toward all, and perfection in all things: as by a torch set down before our eyes by God, so that by its light we may walk continually in the way of that truth. For what can be so necessary for man as to know God, if not as he is, at least as he can be known? What so useful as to be conformed to God, whom he knows, as man knows, or rather as God offers himself to be known? What so glorious as to strive by this saving conformity toward God, as the everlasting fountain of his holiness, [col. 1408] justice, and perfection? [p. 84] To this end three things are comprehended briefly in the declaration of these effects: their kind, their mode, and their duration. The kind of effects is threefold: holiness in ourselves, represented by God through the Spirit of sanctification; justice toward all, giving God his due and each man his; and a fitting perfection of the subject and of the effects in the subject, which here we can desire at present and hope for in the future, but shall not attain fully in fact before we have passed to the Lord, the author of our holiness, justice, and perfection. The mode is that we are directed most perfectly to those effects by that most perfect torch of divine truth, and are led by the power of God who worketh all in all (1 Cor. 12:11). The duration and perpetuity of these virtues is shown in that we say these attributes and effects are taught in all respects by this theology of ours, which alone is truly wisdom.

But of this topic we shall speak in Thesis XXVII,¹ which follows next. It runs thus: This theology, therefore, is one, eternal, and immutable: for what is necessarily true is necessarily one; what is just and holy can never not be just and holy; and finally, what is perfect according to God is wholly and always immutable. We have attached this conclusion to the question of the form of our theology because these three things necessarily belong to its nature and condition. First, that this theology is one, and there are not several forms of it. Second, that it is eternal in duration, and not temporary, as very often happens to any human cognition and knowledge. Third, that both in itself and in all its parts, and indeed in each, it is immutable, and not exposed by any chance to changes. For, as we said before, concrete things and things compounded by some mixture vary in number, in time, and with a thousand changes; but abstract things, or the forms of things spoken of in the abstract, are raised very far above all change. For the true man changes, but never truth; the theologian changes, but never theology. When a man is called true, or a theologian, or just, or holy, etc., he has the account of changeable matter, insofar as he is a man, but has only accidentally the form of truth, theology, holiness, justice, etc.; whereas those pure forms from which men are named true, theologians, holy, and just are uncorrupted by any fault: each is some one thing in itself, each eternal and immutable. The ground of this affirmation of ours must be sought from the nature of the form we have ascribed to theology and from the conditions joined to it. As we said before, we have attributed divine truth as the form of our theology, and to that truth we have added three necessary conditions, namely justice, holiness, and perfection. From each of these are drawn arguments by which the unity, eternity, and immutability of this theology is confirmed. From truth an argument is drawn of this kind: what is necessarily true is necessarily one, and of eternal and immutable truth; but truth is necessarily true; therefore it is one, eternal, and immutable. For what is truer than truth? Or what is so necessarily true as truth? We call that necessary, to use Aristotle's words, which is always as it is and cannot be otherwise or happen otherwise; for the necessary is opposed to the contingent (τῷ ἐνδεχομένῳ). And we call true whatever is, as it is in our intellect, whether actually understood or (so to speak) intelligible. Since we are treating here not of the truth that can be perceived by the human intellect but of divine truth, which infinitely surpasses the small measure of our intellect, and since divine things, as divine, have in themselves altogether the necessity of divine truth, they much more claim for themselves what is laid down concerning the truth of nature or created truth: namely, that what is necessarily true in this kind of divine and supernatural truth is necessarily one, and eternal, and immutable, with a most simple unity, eternity, and immutability, because it is divine. And as this account of our theology is confirmed [p. 85] by the argument from divine truth, so also by that from justice and holiness. For what is just and holy absolutely can never not be just and holy; justice and holiness are just and holy absolutely; therefore it can never be that they are not just and holy, and they are therefore one, eternal, and immutable. But justice and holiness, if any is true, must be called true only if it is the justice and holiness [col. 1409] of divine truth, which is supernatural in itself and in all its attributes, and which is the divine form that God has expressed, one, eternal, and immutable, in this theology of ours. Lastly, since to all these that condition of perfection of which we spoke before is also necessary, I for my part judge that the sure unity, eternity, and immutability of that perfection which is not human, or humanly formed, but divinely expressed in the truth of theology, is surely demonstrated by the perfection we assign to our theology. For what is perfect according to God is wholly and always one, eternal, and immutable; especially since this theology of ours is nothing other than an expressed delineation of that one, eternal, and immutable perfection by which God is most perfect. And God is not only perfect, but the essential perfection itself, and the cause, exemplar, and most constant end of all perfection. It remains, then, that we conclude from what has just been said that this theology is one, eternal, and immutable, and is the most perfect discloser of just, holy, and perfect truth, which God willed to be communicated to the human race after the exemplar of his own truth, for his glory and the salvation of our souls in Christ Jesus.